In the bygone days of U-2 spy planes and Sputnik, the only ethical issues attached to satellites seemed to involve military secrecy and national boundaries. Now, with high-powered lenses, infrared senso ry devices, ubiquitous sateIEites, and instan,t high-resolution image transmission, the communication ethics issues-like the powers of global observation-have greatly magnified. Possibly, conventional warfare has become obsolete because television networks have access to a worldwide satellite images that show troops, fleets, and fighter squadrons forming prior to attack. Civilian privacy has (...) changed drastically as well because backyard sunbathers, naturalists, couples, speeding vehicles, and naked paramours seen through bedroom windows can all be identified, photographed, and publicized without their awareness or permission. Because the power, range, fuequency, and commercialism of such space photography will increase, ethicists must survey the surveillance. Vendors in many countries now routinely sell space imagery to news outlets. This means there are at least two types of communication ethics to consider: (a) In journalism ethics, editors and producers must decide whether they will publish many types of invasive photographs, some of which may also deal with military secrecy; and (b) in new media ethics, decisions about who employs, duplicates, regulates, as well as who sells and buys satellite imagery, must be monitored and debated. (shrink)

What is knowledge? Why is it valuable? How much of it do we have, and what ways of thinking are good ways to use to get more of it? These are just a few questions that are asked in epistemology, roughly, the philosophical theory of knowledge. This is Epistemology is a comprehensive introduction to the philosophical study of the nature, origin, and scope of human knowledge. Exploring both classic debates and contemporary issues in epistemology, this rigorous yet accessible textbook provides (...) readers with the foundation necessary to start doing epistemology. Organized around 11 key subtopics, and assuming no prior knowledge of the subject, this volume exposes readers to diverse, often contentious perspectives—guiding readers through crucial debates including Hume’s problem of induction, Descartes’ engagement with radical skepticism, rationalist and empiricist evaluations of a priori justification, and many more. The authors avoid complex technical terms and jargon in favor of an easy-to-follow, informal writing style with engaging chapters designed to stimulate student interest and encourage class discussion. Throughout the text, a wealth of up-to-date references and links to online resources are provided to enable further investigation of an array of epistemological topics. A balanced and authoritative addition to the acclaimed This is Philosophy series, This is Epistemology is a perfect primary textbook for philosophy undergraduates, and a valuable resource for general readers with interest in this important branch of philosophy. (shrink)

We have written an introduction to epistemology that is accessible, engaging, and up to date. (We hope.) -/- Introduction Chapter 1: The Regress Problem Chapter 2: Perception Chapter 3: The Apriori Chapter 4: Inference Chapter 5: On Knowing the Truth Chapter 6: Memory Chapter 7: Testimony Chapter 8: Kinds of Knowledge Chapter 9: Internalism vs. Externalism Chapter 10: The Ethics of Belief Chapter 11: Skepticism .

Research involving and impacting Indigenous Peoples is often of little or no benefit to the communities involved and, in many cases, causes harm. Ensuring that Indigenous research is not only ethical but also of benefit to the communities involved is a long-standing problem that requires fundamental changes in higher education. To address this necessity for change, the authors of this paper, with the help of graduate and Indigenous community research assistants, undertook community consultation across their university to identify the local (...) and national ethical needs of Indigenous researchers, communities, and Elders. This paper provides an overview of the consultation process, the themes that emerged from the consultations, and a model of the Wholistic Indigenous Research Framework that emerged. (shrink)

While the balance between individual privacy and government monitoring or corporate surveillance has been a frequent topic across numerous disciplines, the issue of privacy within the family has been largely ignored in recent privacy debates. Yet privacy intrusions between parents and children or between adult partners or spouses can be just as profound as those found in the more “public spheres” of life. Popular access to increasingly sophisticated forms of electronic surveillance technologies has altered the dynamics of family relationships. Monitoring, (...) mediated and facilitated by practices of both covert and overt electronic surveillance, has changed the nature of privacy within the family. Parents are tracking children via GPS-enabled cell phone tracking software and are monitoring the Internet use of family members. Parents, siblings, and children are also posting information about their family members online, often without consent, and are creating social media profiles for others online. Prior scholarly work in philosophy and law has primarily addressed the privacy of children from third parties, usually commercial entities, and in the context of making medical decisions. Less attention has been directed at exploring a more general right of privacy of one family member against parents, siblings, children, or spouses. In this article, we do just that. We consider several moral rules that determine appropriate privacy boundaries within the family. More specifically, we will consider when overt or covert surveillance of a child, spouse, or partner by an adult family member is morally permitted. (shrink)

The authors address problems with “compulsory” arbitration clauses in contracts. Specifically, they note that consumers are misguided about their rights in such cases. In addition, arbitration clauses do not allow the press to cover any proceedings that may result. The arbitration clauses in contracts are written in legalese that consumers do not understand. The authors found that even university students had difficulty understanding the information in such clauses. An example of an actual case is included.

Moral hypocrisy is motivation to appear moral yet, if possible, avoid the cost of actually being moral. In business, moral hypocrisy allows one to engender trust, solve the commitment problem, and still relentlessly pursue personal gain. Indicating the power of this motive, research has provided clear and consistent evidence that, given the opportunity, many people act to appear fair (e.g., they flip a coin to distribute resources between themselves and another person) without actually being fair (they accept the flip only (...) if it favors themselves). New evidence also indicates the power of moral hypocrisy in a situation more obviously relevant to business, resource allocation when one party has information about relative resource value that the other does not. Characteristics of modern business situations likely to encourage moral hypocrisy are outlined. We conclude that moral hypocrisy is not only a pragmatic virtue in modern business but is also fast becoming a prescriptive one. (shrink)

A scholarly edition of a work by Adam Smith. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.

D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (1976) II An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner; textual editor W. B. Todd, 2 vols. (1976) III Essays on Philosophical Subjects, ed. W. P. D. Wightman  ...

The problem of translation confronts every English, or French-language reader of Geschlecht III, from its title page on, by way of Derrida’s decision not to translate the German noun Geschlecht. In this paper, I explore the stakes of Derrida’s refusal to translate, by situating it within the context of the 1984–5 seminar, ‘Philosophical Nationality and Nationalism’, from which the text of Geschlecht III was taken. I show that the question of translation is already at the heart of that seminar, which (...) concerns the place of the idiom in philosophy, and why approaching the difficulty posed by the untranslatability of a term like Geschlecht might be the very objective of Derrida’s reading of Heidegger on Trakl. (shrink)

A scholarly edition of a work by Adam Smith. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.

This chapter contains section titled: I In What Sense is Dworkin's Liberalism Neutral? II Two Parameters III Liberal Neutrality and the Sacred Acknowledgement.

This article addresses the so-called to human rights. Focusing specifically on the work of Onora O'Neill, the article challenges two important aspects of her version of this objection. First: its narrowness. O'Neill understands the claimability of a right to depend on the identification of its duty-bearers. But there is good reason to think that the claimability of a right depends on more than just that, which makes abstract (and not welfare) rights the most natural target of her objection (section II). (...) After examining whether we might address this reformulated version of O'Neill's objection by appealing to the specificity afforded to human rights in international, regional and domestic law (in section III), the article challenges a second important feature of that objection by raising doubts about whether claimability is a necessary feature of rights at all (section IV). Finally, the article reflects more generally on the role of abstraction in the theory and practice of human rights (section V). In sum, by allaying claimability-based concerns about abstract rights, and by illustrating some of the positive functions of abstraction in rights discourse, the article hopes to show that abstract rights are not only theoretically coherent but also useful and important. (shrink)

This special issue of Journal of Poetry Therapy focuses on the use of poetry and other forms of expressive writing to explore the transformative experiences of military veterans, and so in this article I discuss how the use of poetry, hip-hop, and philosophy positively influenced my life while I was serving in the United States Air Force (USAF) from 2000 through 2004. This article briefly reviews my reasons for enlisting and discusses the importance that poetry, hip-hop, and philosophy had for (...) me during four different phases of my military history: (i) Basic Military Training, (ii) Aircraft Qualification, Combat Survival, and Water Survival Training, (iii) serving in the post 9/11 operations Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, and (iv) the period after fulfilling my time of service for the USAF. In discussing each phase, I explain the unique challenges that I encountered, how I used poetry, hip-hop, and philosophy to successfully overcome these challenges, point out relevant examples of poetry, hip-hop, and philosophy that were particularly influential, and include pictures of my experiences throughout. (shrink)

Sogdian Epigraphy of Central Asia and Semirech’e. By Vladimir A. Livshits, translated by Tom Stableford and edited by Nicholas Sims-Williams. Corpus Inscriptionum Iranicarum, pt. II: Inscriptions of the Seleucid and Parthian periods of Eastern Iran and Central Asia, vol. III: Sogdian IV. London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 2015. Pp. 315. £60.

Contemporary diagnostic categories and various modes of treatment of mood disorders contribute to the development of a managed form of selfhood in contemporary society, particularly as articulated with management in the workplace. This produces a new iteration of the normal in relation to psychopathology; instead of the normal as an absence of disorder or distress, normalcy becomes the private management, often stemming from an external or internalized social injunction, of symptoms through various available techniques of self-care. I support this claim (...) through an analysis of the development of the category of the mood disorder under DSM-III and the functioning of common contemporary treatments such as antidepressant medications, cognitive-behavioral therapy, and alternative techniques such as mindfulness meditation. A new social problematic emerges, in part out of this convergence, in which the notion of mood becomes generalized and an object of vigilance. Everyone has moods; we always have moods; and moods are in principle always subject to the need of being managed. (shrink)

This paper examines hart's model (1967) of the retributive theory. section i criticizes the model for not answering all the main questions to which a theory of punishment should be addressed, as hart alleges it does. section ii criticizes the model for its omission of the concept of desert. section iii criticizes attempts by card (1973) and by von hirsch (1976) to provide new ways of proportioning punitive severity to criminal injury. section iv discusses the idea of retribution in justifying (...) aim and criticizes the theory of fingarette (1977). the conclusion is that the new retributivists have not solved the problems inherent to older versions of the theory. (shrink)

People intend to do things, try to do things, and do things. Do they also will to do things? More precisely, if people will to do things and their willing bears upon what they do, is willing, or volition, something distinct from intending and trying? This question is central to the intention/volition debate, a debate about the ingredients of the best theory of the nature and explanation of human action. A variety of competing conceptions of volition, intention, and trying have (...) been advanced in the literature; it would be impossible to examine each thoroughly in a single paper. We can show, however, that the major functional roles ascribed to volition are nicely filled by a triad composed of intention, trying, and information feedback. Sections I and II below develop an account of the connection between intention and trying. Section III examines leading arguments for the existence of volitions and decomposes volitions into members of the triad just identified. (shrink)

Many philosophers invoke the "wisdom of nature" in arguing for varying degrees of caution in the development and use of genetic enhancement technologies. Because they view natural selection as akin to a master engineer that creates functionally and morally optimal design, these authors tend to regard genetic intervention with suspicion. In Part II, we examine and ultimately reject the evolutionary assumptions that underlie the master engineer analogy (MEA). By highlighting the constraints on ordinary unassisted evolution, we show how intentional genetic (...) modification can overcome many of the natural impediments to the human good. Our contention is that genetic engineering offers a solution that is more eff icient, reliable, versatile, and morally palatable than the lumbering juggernaut of Darwinian evolution. In Part III, we evaluate a recent attempt to ground precautionary enhancement heuristics in adaptive etiology. Our problem with this approach is two-fold: first, it is based on the same "strong adaptationist" interpretation of evolution that motivates the flawed MEA, and second, the etiological concept of function on which it relies provides indirect and potentially misleading information about the likely consequences of genetic intervention. We offer instead enhancement criteria based on causal relationships in ontogeny. We conclude that rather than grounding a presumption against deliberate genetic modification, the causal structure of the living world gives us good moral reason to pursue it. (shrink)

Smith proposes an account of how languages developed. He did so not as historian, but as a philosopher with a special concern about how a nominalist could account for general terms. Names for individuals are taken as fairly unproblematic – say ‘Thames’ and ‘Avon’ for each of the respective rivers. But whence the word ‘river,’ applicable to more than one, if all that exist are particular objects? Smith’s view is not the usual one, according to which people deploy a powerful (...) ability to abstract mentally, and subsequently affix a label to a general concept. He resisted this because he granted that such robust mental processes themselves presuppose the use of words. Rather, what holds the class together is the word itself, a “single appellation.”. (shrink)

5 ERSTER TEIL Forschungsprobleme der Semantik 1. Sprachwissenschaft 10 11. Logik 27 III. Die semantische Philosophie 55 1. Die sogenannte «Wende der Philosophi- die Sprache als einziger Gegenstand der Forschung 60 2. Die Sprache als Schöpfung der arbiträren Konvention 75 IV. Die allgemeine Semantik (General Semantics) 88 ZWEITER TEIL Ausgewählte Kategorien der Semantik 1. Der philosophische Aspekt des Kommunikationsprozesses 108 1. Das Wesen des Problems der Kommunikation 112 2. Der Streit der transzendentalen mit der naturalistischen Konzeption 123 3. Grundlagen einer (...) marxistischen Betrachtung des Problems 131 11. Das Zeichen -Analyse und Typologie 145 1. Der Kommunikationsprozeß als Ausgangspunkt bei der Analyse des Zeichens 145 2. Die Zeichentypologie von Husserl 152 3. Die Definition des Zeichens 162 4. Allgemeine Grundlagen der Zeichentypologie 164 5. Die Spezifik der Wortzeichen 180 III. Die Bedeutungen von «Bedeutung» 196 1. über die Zeichensituation 199 2. Die Bedeutung als realer oder ideeller Gegenstand 210 3. Die Bedeutung als eine Beziehung (1) 226 4. Die Bedeutung als eine Beziehung (2) 241 5. Die linguistische Auffassung des Problems der Bedeutung 276 IV. Die kommunikative Funktion der Sprache 285 1. Sprache und «Sprachen» 286 2. Sprache und Wirklichkeit 294 3. Die Sprache und die effektive Verständigung 321 Nachwort zur deutschen Ausgabe von Georg Klaus 334 über den Verfasser 341 Anhang Fremdsprachige Zitate in Originalfassung 344 Bibliographie 358 Personenregister 374 Vorwort Das Vorwort des Verfassers entspringt oft der Konvention und stellt dann ein Zugeständnis dem überlieferten Brauch gegenüber dar. (shrink)

In C.Q. 1935, 72–82 and 150–163 I published some observations on Herodotus which were the by-product of a translation. Those which follow are the similar by-product of a lexicon. It says much for the delusive simplicity of Herodotus that it is still possible to reap a critical crop from an author who has been read by Reiske, Dobree and Cobet. Had van Herwerden not edited Herodotus, the harvest would have been twice as large.

In an article in the July 1959 issue of the American Journal of Philology, Mr. William Calder III offers two suggestions for the interpretation of 11. 1271–4 of Sophocles' Oedipus Rex, one concerning the reference of wv in 1271, and the other, the reference of in 1273 and 1274.

In an article in the July 1959 issue of the American Journal of Philology, Mr. William Calder III offers two suggestions for the interpretation of 11. 1271–4 of Sophocles' Oedipus Rex, one concerning the reference of wv in 1271, and the other, the reference of in 1273 and 1274.

We have structured our response according to five questions arising from the commentaries: (i) What is sentience? (ii) Is sentience a necessary or sufficient condition for moral standing? (iii) What methods should guide comparative cognitive research in general, and specifically in studying invertebrates? (iv) How should we balance scientific uncertainty and moral risk? (v) What practical strategies can help reduce biases and morally dismissive attitudes toward invertebrates?

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:207 THE CARELESS SKEPTIC THE 'PAMPHILIAN' IRONIES IN HUME'S DIALOGUES In "Hume and the Legacy of the Dialogues" E. C. Mossner sets out a widely accepted interpretation of one of Hume's major intentions in that great work. He argues that Hume's main use of irony therein is to dissimulate with respect to his true religious convictions. The purpose is to provide Hume with a defense against the expected negative (...) reaction to the powerful attack on religion mounted 2 in the Dialogues. The attack, as is well known, is set out in the arguments of Philo against natural and revealed religion as espoused by Cleanthes and Demea, and Philo's views are taken to be those of Hume. It is argued or assumed that since such attacks were in Hume's day imprudent, they must be made by indirection, that is, by a device such as irony. Thus the Dialogues have surface meanings in which the religious views under attack are said (by Pamphilus) to win out; they also have other meanings, underlying or implicit, in which the religious views are conclusively refuted. That they are refuted is a conclusion drawn by the interpreters, in the present case Mossner and those who share his views. These destructive refutations are derived from explication and assessment of the ongoing argument as embodied in the explicit statements of the contestants, and are thus not explicitly linked to Hume. In consequence, quite often from one standpoint (a trivial one of external comment by an immature and prejudiced onlooker) the design argument wins; and from another, more sophisticated one, it loses. The upshot is that "Philo, who as Hume's spokesman for mitigated 208 skepticism will perforce be the victor in the philosophic debate, will nevertheless be 'artfully' depicted as being vanquished by the antagonist." The strategy Mossner finds in the Dialogues thus has the youthful Pamphilus, a ward of Cleanthes, and one who takes no actual part in the adversarial discussions, interposing (in brief asides) comments that superficially but subtly belittle Philo's philosophical position. Philo is characterized, for instance, as having a "careless scepticism," in contrast with Cleanthes, who has an "accurate philosophical turn [of mind]" (D 128). Similarly, at the end of the Dialogues, Pamphilus awards the victory to Cleanthes. In support of his thesis that Philo is a devious Hume's mouthpiece, Mossner brings forth two kinds of evidence, roughly characterizable as external and internal. One kind of external evidence is exemplified in Hume's correspondence with Gilbert 4 5 Elliot of Minto, and Adam Smith; the letters involved are interpreted as showing that Philo represents Hume. Another kind involves comparing the amount of space devoted to the arguments of the three adversaries. The internal evidence is derived from the explication and appraisal of the explicit statements of the contestants; and it is essentially identified with the arguments and conclusions of Philo, except where Cleanthes can be said to make claims which square with those made by Hume in other works such as the Treatise. Thus Hume's views and the related arguments are interpreted as those of Philo, in part because they are considered to be more valid and sound than those of Cleanthes, and in part because they are held to square with the views and arguments affirmed in Hume's other writings. Hume's views, as indicated above, are taken to be those of 209 Philo except where Philo appears to agree with Cleanthes and to accept a form of the design argument. Hume is Cleanthes when Cleanthes sets forth doctrines of the Treatise and the Enquiry that are in accordance with the received (more or less) positivistic interpretation of Hume's skepticism. It is this view that requires that in those places in Parts III, X, and XII, where Philo appears to avow a form of the design argument or to let it stand unrefuted, he be (ironically) dissimulating. Thus the surface victories of Cleanthes and natural religion, which the adversarial flow of the statements of Philo and Cleanthes exhibits, are refuted by the propositions derived from the assessed form and content of the philosophical debate. The basic irony, therefore, lies in aspects of the... (shrink)

The remarks I wish to make upon the Thucydides scholia in Bâle University MS. no. E III 4 will be clearer if prefaced by an outline history of the scholia to Thucydides in general.The editio princeps contained no scholia. They made their first appearance in the following year as an appendix to the Aldine Gemistius and Herodian. The same scholia were then reprinted in the Juntine edition as a frame to the text. In the Hervagian edition of Camerarius they were (...) relegated to the end, and Camerarius claims in his prefatory epistle to have expended some trouble in emending them. Henceforward the same corpus of scholia, unchanged save for occasional emendation, passes on from edition to edition, either framing the text, as in Stephanus, or beneath it, as in Stephanus, Hudson, Duker, Gottleber-Bauer-Beck. (shrink)

xs1F61ς … xs22EFξειργxs22EFσατο of MSS. is generally corrected to the third person plural, but it would be more like Thucydides to xs22EFξεxs22EFργαστο write: this would then be another instance of the corruption of pluperfects, such as S000983880001956X_inline1 into xs1F20γγxs22EFλλετο and the like, of which many instances are given by Cobet in Nov. Lect. 422, Var. Lect. 253. In the old edition of Poppo, 1826, vol. ii. pt. ii. p. 297, xs22EFξxs22EFπγαστο is given as contained in Cod. Bas. ex emend., but (...) it is not noticed by Poppo-Stahl or recent editors. Ως with the pluperfect is Thucydidean: Mr. Marchant on ii. 59 refers to iii. 23, 1; 26, 4; 27, 1; 69, 2. See the remarks of Poppo in vol. i. part ii. p. 44 sq. on this MS. (shrink)

xs1F61ς … xs22EFξειργxs22EFσατο of MSS. is generally corrected to the third person plural, but it would be more like Thucydides to xs22EFξεxs22EFργαστο write: this would then be another instance of the corruption of pluperfects, such as S000983880001956X_inline1 into xs1F20γγxs22EFλλετο and the like, of which many instances are given by Cobet in Nov. Lect. 422, Var. Lect. 253. In the old edition of Poppo, 1826, vol. ii. pt. ii. p. 297, xs22EFξxs22EFπγαστο is given as contained in Cod. Bas. ex emend., but (...) it is not noticed by Poppo-Stahl or recent editors. Ως with the pluperfect is Thucydidean: Mr. Marchant on ii. 59 refers to iii. 23, 1; 26, 4; 27, 1; 69, 2. See the remarks of Poppo in vol. i. part ii. p. 44 sq. on this MS. (shrink)

J. N. Adams, Michael Lapidge, and Tobias Reinhardt: IntroductionJ. H. W. Penney: Connections in Archaic Latin ProseJ. Briscoe: Language and Style of the Fragmentary Republican HistoriansJ. N. Adams: The Bellum AfricumChristina Shuttleworth Kraus: Hair, Hegemony, and Historiography: Caesar's Style and its Earliest CriticsJ. G. F. Powell: Cicero's Adaptation of Legal Latin in the De legibusTobias Reinhardt: Language of Epicureanism in Cicero: The Case of AtomismG. O. Hutchinson: Pope's Spider and Cicero's WritingR. G. Mayer: The Impracticability of 'Kunstprosa'H. M. Hine: (...) Poetic Influence on Prose: The Case of the Younger SenecaHarm Pinkster: The Language of Pliny the ElderD. R. Russell: Omisso speciosiore stili genereS. J. Harrison: The Poetics of Fiction: Poetic Influence on the Languages of Apuleius' MetamorphosesD. R. Langslow: 'Langues réduites au lexique'? The Languages of Latin Technical ProseDanuta Shanzer: of Tours and Poetry: Prose into Verse and Verse into ProseMichael Lapidge: Poeticism in Pre-Conquest Anglo-Latin ProseRichard Sharpe: The Varieties of Bede's ProseCarlotta Dionisotti: Translator's LatinWalter Berschin: Realistic Writing in the Tenth Century: : Gerhard of Ausburg's Vita S. UodalriciR. M. Thomson: William of Malmesbury and the Latin Classics RevisitedGiovanni Orlandi: Metrical and Rhythmical Clausulae in Medieval Latin Prose: Some Aspects and Problems. (shrink)